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               Abstract
It has often been argued that that the relative risk aversion (RRA) coefficient should decrease as
a household becomes wealthier.  However, existing tests of full risk sharing hypothesis in the
empirical literature are derived using preferences that exhibit either increasing or constant RRA
(CRRA).  In this paper, we model decreasing RRA using Stone-Geary utility, which is the CRRA
utility augmented by a “subsistence” parameter.  Decreasing RRA implies that consumption of
wealthy households will fluctuate more than that of poor ones under full risk sharing in an
economy with aggregate risk, because rich households are more willing to bear risk.  Using
IFPRI and ICRISAT data, we find evidence in support of the hypothesis at the village level, and
evidence against it at the inter-village level.  When restricting the “subsistence” parameter to be
zero, we replicate the previous results in the literature: reject it at both levels.  Our tests,
however, reject this restriction and favor the decreasing RRA in almost all cases.  These results
suggest that it is important to allow for decreasing RRA in testing full risk sharing hypothesis
when data containing low-income households are investigated.
Key Words: Risk Sharing, Consumption Smoothing, Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion,  
                     Generalized Method of Moments
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      DECREASING RELATIVE RISK AVERSION AND TESTS OF RISK SHARING
        1. INTRODUCTION
IN THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE of risk sharing, parameterized forms of utility
functions have been used.  When functional forms are misspecified, tests can yield
misleading results.  Even though one cannot entertain a general form of the utility
function because it is always possible to find a utility function that is consistent with any
observation, it is important to use a flexible enough functional form to allow for
important likely features of preferences over risky consumption.
  How the relative risk aversion (RRA) coefficient varies with wealth has important
implications on dynamic consumption decisions.  It has often been argued that it is very
likely that the RRA coefficient decreases as a household becomes richer (see, e.g., Mas-
Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), pp. 192-193, for a discussion).  Indeed, Rosenzweig
and Binswanger (1993) find that farmers are in general risk averse, but the wealthier they
are, the less their investment portfolios are affected by increasing weather risk.  This is
consistent with, and could be caused by, decreasing RRA.  However, isoelastic,
exponential, and quadratic utility functions are typically used in the empirical literature of
risk sharing.  The isoelastic utility functions imply constant RRA, and exponential and
quadratic utility functions imply that the RRA coefficient increases with the level of
wealth.  If the RRA coefficient decreases with the level of wealth, then wealthier
households are willing to bear more risk.  As a result, consumption of richer households
could fluctuate more than that of poorer households even under complete risk sharing
when aggregate shocks are present.  Such an allocation of risk may result from2
systematically different investment strategies between rich and poor households: the poor
may choose to hold lower risk and lower return assets than the rich.  Again, Rosenzweig
and Binswanger (1993) find empirical evidence for such a systematic difference in
portfolio strategies, using the household level panel data from India collected by the
International Crops Research Institute in the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT).    A simple
way to model decreasing RRA is to introduce a (what we call for convenience)
“subsistence parameter” into the isoelastic CRRA utility.  If this parameter is positive,
then RRA coefficient will be very high when a household is consuming near the value of
this parameter.
2  Previously, Atkeson and Ogaki (1996) and Ogaki and Atkeson (1997)
have found empirical evidence in support of positive subsistence parameter, also using
the ICRISAT data.
3  But tests of full risk sharing have generally ignored this parameter
and its effect on the RRA coefficient, even though they have been applied to datasets
containing low-income households (see, e.g., Altug and Miller (1990), Deaton (1990),
Morduch (1990), Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), Udry (1994), and Hayashi, Altonji, and
                                                          
2 Zimmerman and Carter (1996) simulates an economic model in which poor consumers decide to hold less
riskier assets than rich ones because of a positivie subsistence parameter.
3 This paper is related to these two papers by Akeson and Ogaki in the sense that we are using almost the
same complete markets model.  However, the theme of this paper is risk aversion and risk sharing.  Three
major differences in this paper are: (i). A variable addition test, arguably more powerful than Hansen's J test
against incomplete risk sharing alternatives, is developed, as discussed in Section 3 below; (ii). We
investigate the effect of restricting the subsistence parameter to be zero on the testing of full risk sharing
hypothesis and are able to replicate the results in the current literature; (iii). A Pakistani dataset with much
more villages, as well as the Indian data, are used in the empirical work, and very robust results are
obtained.3
Kotlikoff (1996)).  An exception is Townsend (1994), who reports that his results remain
unchanged when some values of the subsistence level are tried for the ICRISAT data.
This method, however, ignores the effect of estimating unknown subsistence level on the
test statistics for full risk sharing.  Townsend finds substantial comovements of
consumption within a village, and much less comovements across villages.  His formal
statistics, however, reject the null hypothesis of  full risk sharing within villages as well
as across villages.  Sawada (1996) applies tests that are similar to Townsend's to the panel
data set of rural Pakistani households collected by the Food Security Management Project
of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and finds mixed results for
the hypothesis of full risk sharing within villages.
In this paper, we first present a model with decreasing RRA.  Then we test the
hypothesis of full risk sharing, taking into account the effect of estimating unknown
subsistence parameter on the test statistics.  Subsistence levels have been estimated from
intratemporal first order conditions of the linear expenditure system in the literature of
consumer demand (see, e.g., Stone (1954), Pollak and Wales (1969), Parks (1969), and
Deaton (1974)).  For the purpose of testing full risk sharing, however, it is desirable to
use intertemporal conditions, which are directly related to risk sharing.
We apply our tests to the IFPRI and ICRISAT panel data of households.  These data
sets are of interest because they contain data of low income households, for whom
decreasing RRA may well be the case.  A unique feature of the IFPRI data set is that
consumption and income data were collected separately from different members of each
household.  This feature is attractive for our purpose, because our tests, like most of the
existing tests of full risk sharing, require the assumption that the measurement error in4
consumption is not correlated with income variables.  The ICRISAT data set has been
used extensively in development economics in general, and the risk sharing literature in
particular.  The reason to include it here is that we think it is important to compare the
results from different datasets.  After all, a good model should be able to “survive” as
many datasets as possible in the empirical tests.  In addition, it should also be very
interesting to compare our results based on this dataset with those reported in the
literature where the implication of decreasing RRA has been ignored.
Incomplete risk sharing can be caused by moral hazard and adverse selection
problems, which are in turn caused by private information.  Without private information,
various arrangements can be used by the members of the community to share risk even
when financial markets are not well developed.  Private information is more likely to be
present in a large community, or in an economy with more complicated production
technologies than in a small community with simple production technologies.  Hence full
risk sharing can be a good approximation of the consumption growth pattern for a village
economy in low income countries.  On the other hand, full risk sharing across villages
which are farther apart is not likely to be a good approximation.  This consideration
provides us with a measure of the power of our tests: a powerful test for the null
hypothesis of full risk sharing should be able to reject full risk sharing across villages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we present our model and
discuss implications of a subsistence parameter on the RRA coefficient and consumption
growth.  We describe the data in Section 3.  In Section 4, we explain our tests for full risk
sharing which take into account the effect of estimating subsistence parameter.  We
present empirical results in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes the paper.5
2. THE MODEL
2.1 An Arrow-Debreu Economy
Consider an economy with H households.  Let household h, h=1,...,H, have time and
state separable utility with an intratemporal utility function  ( ) ( ) ( ) t e t u C h , , where
( ) ( ) t e t C h ,  is per capita consumption.  In this paper household size is measured by the
number of male-adult equivalents.  So the per capita here, and henceforth, is actually per
male-adult equivalent.  The advantage of doing so is that all demographic variations, both
across households and over the time, will have been taken care of.  Let a vector s(t),
s(t)=1,2,...,S, denote the state of the world in each period.  The history of the economy can
then be denoted by the vector e(t)=[s(0),s(1),...,s(t)].  Let bdenote the common discount
factor in the economy.  Then household h’s problem is to maximize
(1)   ( ) ( ) ) ( , )) 0 ( | ) ( Pr(
0 ) (
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where Th is the life-time of the household, and can either be finite as in the life cycle
model or infinite as in Barro (1974); W(0) is household h's per male-adult equivalent
initial wealth; R e e ( , ( ), ( ) k k k - - 1 1 )is the gross asset return of the state contingent6
security for the event e( ) k in terms of the good in the event e( ) k -1 at period k -1.
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(e( ) k  is suppressed below for the sake of simplicity.)  Now assume that
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where g is the preference parameter that governs whether the RRA coefficient increases
or decreases with the level of wealth.  The RRA coefficient, qh , of a household h
implied by (3) is
















h .If g is zero, then the RRA coefficient is a, since (3)
reduces to the CRRA case.  If g is positive, then the RRA coefficient is large for a poor
household whose consumption is close to g.  But as the household becomes richer, the RRA
coefficient falls and approaches a.  If g is negative, then the RRA coefficient rises with the
level of wealth.  For positive g, one interpretation of this preference parameter is that it is
subsistence consumption.  Therefore we will call g subsistence consumption in this paper,
though other interpretations are also possible. The intertemporal first order condition for
the optimization problem of household h includes
(5)                                           ( )








 =f( ) t +1 ,
for any state of the world, where f( ) t +1 = [bR(t,e(t),e(t+1))Pr(e(t+1)|e(t))]
1/a.
Equation (5) holds for each h.  Since f( ) t +1 is independent of h,  g - C h , the
consumption in excess of subsistence level, should grow at the same rate for all
                                                          
4 R(-1, e(-1),e(0)) is assumed to be 1.7
households in any state of the world.  This is because idiosyncratic risk is insured away
through the complete asset markets in the model.
2.2  Consumption Growth of the Rich and the Poor   The existence of
wealth-varying relative risk aversion coefficient implies consumption growth differs
systematically between the rich and the poor in our model.  Intuitively, households with
higher RRA coefficients will be more willing to bear risk and will experience more
volatile consumption growth than those with lower RRA coefficients.  One way to see
implications on consumption growth is to examine the exact solution for consumption
growth.  Let Ch  =Ch - g .  Let  $ x be the growth rate of any variable x, and lnx be the
natural log of x.  Then
(6)           $ ( ) C t h  = ln[ ( ) C t h exp( $ ( )) ] C t + g  - ln(Ch (t) +g ),
where  $ ( ) C t is the common growth rate of Ch (t) at t.  (6) implies                 
sign( $ ( ) C t h ) = sign( $ ( ) C t ).
Differentiating the right hand side of (6) with respect to Ch (t) yields
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Assuming that g is positive, (7) implies
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(8)                                                   = sign ( $ ( ) C t ).
Hence the rich households' consumption grows at faster rates in a state in which aggregate
consumption grows, declines at faster rates in the states in which aggregate consumption
declines.
Note that  $ ( ) C t is in fact f( ) t -1.  Therefore, a positive  $ ( ) C t  implies  
                       bR t e t e t e t e t ( , ( ), ( ))Pr( ( )| ( )) - - - > 1 1 1 1,
i.e.
                                   ln R t e t e t e t e t ( , ( ), ( ))Pr( ( )| ( )) - - - 1 1 1 > -lnb
The right-hand side of the inequality is just the rate of time preference, d , while the left-
hand side is the real rate of return of the state-contingent security for state e t ( ),
r t e t e t ( , ( ), ( )) -1 .  With this said, it is easy to see that (8) can be furthered to
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The second equality of (8’) says that in states in which the real return of assets is higher
than the rate of time preference, the consumption growth rates of the rich households are
higher than those of the poor households; but in states in which the real rate of return falls
below the time preference rate, the consumption of rich households declines faster than
poor households.  Since the rate of time preference is a constant, the implication of the
model is very clear: accompanying the fluctuations in real returns of assets around the
time preference rate, the fluctuations in consumption of the rich households are larger9
than those of the poor households.  Therefore the rich households bear more risk than the
poor households in the equilibrium.
The implications above are obtained with the aid of the assumption that g is positive.  It
is natural for us to make this assumption, since we interpret it as subsistence
consumption.  (As a curvature parameter, g can be either positive or negative.)  As we
shall see in the empirical part below, the estimates of g are indeed all positive, statistically
significant, and economically meaningful, except for one district in the Pakistani data.
5
These results suggest that consumption growth is correlated with the level of wealth
and hence current and lagged income across households in our model.  The direction of
correlation depends on whether or not aggregate consumption grows or declines.  Our
results also suggest that consumption growth can be correlated with income level and
income growth even under complete risk sharing.  For example, consider the case where
the economy in our model grows over time.  In a growing economy, rich households'
consumption grows at a faster rate.  In general, higher consumption growth of rich
households are attained by higher saving rates that result in higher income growth.  Thus
consumption growth will be positively correlated with income growth across households.
It is possible that such nonzero correlation of consumption growth and income variables
are misinterpreted as evidence for liquidity constraints or incomplete markets in our
model economy if subsistence levels are ignored.  This problem may be alleviated by
examining correlation of consumption growth and labor income growth rather than total
income growth.  This, however, is not a final solution if faster rates of human capital
                                                          
5  Even for this district (Dir), the estimate of g becomes positive and significant when we pool the data
from all the districts in the sample.   Please refer to Tables V and VI.10
accumulation and resulting higher labor income growth are used to achieve higher
consumption growth of rich households.   If we make an additional assumption that the
real risk free interest rate is constant as in Hall (1978), then the common growth rate of
C  is a martingale difference with possibly a drift (using a log normal assumption or a
linear approximation).  However, we do not assume that the real risk free interest rate is
constant.        3. ECONOMETRIC METHOD   As discussed in the
previous section, complete risk sharing implies that the growth rate of Ch - g  is
identical for all households in each state of each period (see Equation (5)).  We now
assume that consumption is measured with error:
6(9)
( ) ( ) ( ) t t t
h h
m
h C C x + = ,where C t h
m( ) is measured consumption in per
adult-equivalent terms, and  ) (t h x  is measurement error.  Then combining (5) and (9), we




h ,where e t h( ) +1
=xh (t+1) - f( ) t +1 xh (t).    Now assume that xh (t) is uncorrelated with household h's
permanent and current incomes at time t.  Let  yh
p be a proxy of its permanent income,
and  yh (t) be its current income.  Let Z t h( )= (1, yh
p,D yh(t))' be a vector of instrumental
variables.  Let y = (f(2),...,f (T), g ) be the T-dimensional vector of unknown
parameters and y 0 be the corresponding vector of their true values.  T is the number of
the time periods of the sample.  In addition, let  ) ), 1 ( ( y + t C f
m
h  be the 3-dimensional
vector
                                                          
6 Ogaki and Atkeson (1997) discuss the choice between additive and multiplicative measurement errors.11
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where EH  is the expectation operator over households.  Here H is attached to emphasize
that the expectation is taken over households.  Assume a central limit theorem applies to
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' can be estimated by Hansen (1982)’s generalized method of moments (GMM) using
(12) as othorgonality conditions.  In the estimation, we first pool the orthogonality
conditions for all the households in each village, then stack the matrix of orthogonality
conditions for all the villages in the same district.   fh( ) y0  is allowed to have different
covariance matrices for different villages when the data are pooled.
7  We consider
                                                                                                                                                                            
They suggest that an additive specification would be better for the purpose of testing risk shairng.
7 We assume that the regularity conditions of Gallant and White (1988) are satisfied.
Hansen/Heaton/Ogaki's GAUSS GMM package (see Ogaki (1993b)) is used for the GMM estimation in this
paper.  Ogaki (1993a, Section 4.3) provides a more detailed explanation as to how the data for villages are
pooled.12
two types of tests.  One type of test is the c-square test of the overidentifying restrictions,
which is called Hansen's J test.  Under the null hypothesis of full risk sharing, the
disturbance term in (10) is uncorrelated with the income variables in the set of the
instrumental variables.  Therefore, the J test statistic has an asymptotic c-square
distribution.  Under the alternative hypothesis of incomplete risk sharing, the disturbance
in (10) will be correlated with income variables.  Hence the J test statistic will tend to be
large. The other type of test is based on variable addition.  We add the income difference
term to (10) to obtain:(14)




h h gf g f
Under the null hypothesis of full risk sharing,  h = 0, because the first order condition of
the model indicates that individual income change should play no role in explaining
individual consumption when the effect of  g  is accounted for.  However, under the
alternative hypothesis of incomplete risk sharing, individual income variables will affect
individual consumption growth even after controlling for the effect of  g  and the effect of
the aggregate shock.  For example, take the alternative hypothesis of Keynesian
consumption function,  ) ( ) ( t b a t y C h h + = , where 0<b<1.  Under this hypothesis, a
GMM estimation for (14) would result in  1 ) ( = t f , and  b = h , and therefore h would be
positive.  Thus we can test the hypothesis of full risk sharing by testing the null of  0 = h .
This additional term could increase the power of the full risk sharing test, since by
augmenting the model this way it is easier to pick up the correlation between the
consumption and income variables now if it indeed exists.13
   In our empirical work, we pool data for villages, and the variable addition testing is
conducted at two levels.  At the village level, we test whether or not h estimate is
significantly different from zero for each village.  At the pooled district level, we test
whether or not the h estimates of the villages in the same district are jointly significant.
This is done by computing the likelihood-ratio-type test statistic, which is the difference
between the constrained Hansen's J statistic and the unconstrained J statistic.
8    The
variable addition tests are (arguably) more powerful than Hansen's J test against the
alternative hypothesis of incomplete risk sharing.  Hansen's J test tests against any
correlation of the instrumental variables and the disturbance term.  The variable addition
tests are specifically directed toward the positive correlation between consumption and
income which incomplete risk sharing implies.  In addition, the variable addition test
based on the income coefficient in each village can be used to test against incomplete risk
sharing for each village even when data are pooled for many villages.  Indeed, our
empirical results are consistent with this argument. The results from the variable
addition tests and Hansen's J tests are consistent in most cases.  The only exceptions are
for two Pakistani villages, where the variable addition test based on the income-difference
coefficient rejects the null hypothesis of complete risk sharing, but Hansen's J test does
not reject it. Another experiment that we will do is to examine what happens if we
force  g =0 in the estimation and testing.  As pointed out in the Introduction, the current
literature generally ignores the role of  g .  Forcing  g =0 is equivalent to what other
researchers have done in their tests.  If we can replicate the result of rejecting the null of
                                                          
8See, e.g., Ogaki (1993) for a description of the likelihood-ratio-type test.14
full risk sharing at village level when we impose this restriction, but can not reject it
when allowing  g  to be estimated, then we can be confident that it is the restriction  g =0
that is driving the rejection of the model.  In turn, we can test if this restriction itself is
“reasonable” or not.  If it is decisively rejected, then we conclude that it should not have
been imposed in the estimation and testing, i.e.  g  should have been allowed to be
different from zero.  Then, if by taking into account the effect of estimating  g , indeed we
do not reject the null hypothesis, we conclude that the theory presented in Section 2 is not
rejected by the data.
4. DATA    In this section, we describe the two sets
of household level panel data we use: the data collected in Pakistan by the IFPRI and the
data collected in India by the ICRISAT.
   4.1 The Pakistani Data   The IFPRI data used in this
paper cover the period from April 1986 to September 1989.
9  During this period, 12
rounds of interviews were conducted at each sampled household.  In each interview, a
male questionnaire and a female questionnaire were used separately for collecting
different data.  The male questionnaire consisted of about 170 questions and was mainly
about production, marketing, financing, various revenues, male labor supply and hiring,
and nonfood expenditures.  The female questionnaire had around 120 questions, and was
mainly about demographics, food consumption, health status of children, and female
labor supply.  Food consumption data included purchases of 37 food items, and15
consumption from gifts and own production.  The original survey started with 974
households at 52 villages in four districts.  These four districts were distributed in three
provinces in Pakistan: Punjab, Sind, and Northwest Frontier Province.  Following
Townsend (1994), we use demographic information in each household to calculate male-
adult-equivalent household size, according to the equivalence scales provided by Ryan,
Bidinger, Pushpamma, and Rao (1985). These scales are weights assigned to each
member of a household according to his/her age and sex.  Specifically, the scales are: 1.0
for males 19 or older, and .9 for females of the same age group; .94 and .83 for males and
females, respectively, aged between 13 and 18; for children of either gender between 7
and 12 years old, .67; for children aged 4-6, .52; for those aged 1-3, .32; and for infants,
.05.  In each round of the survey, the status of each member was recorded: present,
traveling, or moved to a new household.  The annual household size used in this paper is
the weighted average of male-adult-equivalent household sizes of all rounds in a year.
   The annual income and food consumption expenditure data calculated by IFRPI are
used in empirical analysis.  The income measure includes nine subcategories: rental
earnings in crops, net crop profits, farm wage income, non-farm income, net livestock
profits, returns to capital, remittances, pension, and zakat.  Since data on total
consumption are not readily available, we test risk sharing for food consumption.
10
Assuming that food consumption is separable from other consumption categories, the
                                                                                                                                                                            
9Although the survey covered at least six years, the data set does not contain consumption data for the
fourth year.  Hence we use the data up to 1989.
10Although some nonfood consumption data were collected, they were in nominal terms.  It is not clear to us
how to obtain real nonfood consumption since prices for nonfood items were not recorded.16
model in Section II applies to food consumption.  For our purpose, using food
consumption is attractive for three reasons.  First, our tests assume that the measurement
error in reported food consumption is uncorrelated with income variables.  Because food
consumption and income variables are essentially collected from different household
members, this assumption is more likely to be valid.  Second, subsistence consumption is
more likely to be important for food than for nonfood.  Third, the aforementioned age-sex
weights were obtained from dietary studies, and are more appropriate if used only for
food consumption.  It is not clear how to obtain appropriate adult-equivalent scales for
nonfood consumption.   The data for Village 15 to Village 20, and Village 52 are missing.
From our sample, we exclude the households with incomplete information on any of the
following: the age-sex composition, the food consumption and the income level for each
of the three years.  Concerned about sample size, we also exclude the villages with less
than 11 households.  As a result, in our sample, we have 633 households in 31 villages.
In upper panel of Table I, we report district and village annual average real per male-
adult-equivalent food consumption.  These numbers are reported to facilitate the
interpretation of the estimates of the subsistence level reported in the ensuing tables.
       4.2 The Indian Data    In this section, we describe the
household level panel data collected in India by the ICRISAT.
11  We use panel data for
                                                          
11 Following Townsend  (1994), we use the consumption data in ICRISAT's summary data.  There are two
ways of estimating consumption using the ICRISAT data.  The ICRISAT's method is to infer it from
transactions.  The other method is to retrieve consumption by applying flow accounting identities to the
production and storage data, which Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) propose.  Their consumption data are
very different from the ICRISAT's consumption data, and the difference is correlated with income.  We17
three villages (Aurepalle, Shirapur, and Kanzara) from fiscal year 1975-76 to fiscal year
1984-85.  (In what follows, we denote each fiscal year by its first calendar year).  In this
paper, we report the results for food consumption.
12  Because the construction of food
consumption was changed in 1976, food consumption data for 1975 are not used.  These
Indian panel data have been used to study consumption smoothing and risk sharing
models by many authors.
13
We use food including milk, sweets, and spices as the measure of food consumption.
To construct real consumption per male adult equivalent, nominal consumption at t is
divided by the family size measure constructed by Townsend (1994) and the
corresponding food price index at t for each village.  These real variables are valued at
1983 prices.    There are about forty households for each year in each of the three villages
in the data.  Some households drop out of the sample and others are added to the sample
over years in the ICRISAT data.  We exclude these households from our sample.  The
number of households in our sample for the village of Aurepalle is 35; that for Shirapur,
33; and that for Kanzara, 36. We report in the lower panel of Table II village level annual
average real per male-adult-equivalent food consumption. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
refer the reader to Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) and Townsend (pp. 554-555) for discussions of the
suitability of these consumption data.  It does not seem clear which consumption data set is more reliable.
12 Nonfood Consumption are missing for most categories after 1982.  Results for total consumption are
similar to those for food consumption, and can be found in Ogaki, Atekeson, and Zhang (1997).
13 See, e.g., Bhargava and Ravallion (1993), Jacoby and Skoufias (1993, 1995), Lim  (1992), Rosenzweig
(1988), Rosenzweig and Stark (1989), and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993).18
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS In this section, we report our empirical results for the two
panel data sets.
        5.1 Results for the Pakistani Data The test results for
different districts in the Pakistani data are presented in Tables II, III, IV, and V.  In each
table, the first row reports the baseline results in which subsistence consumption (g) is
restricted to be equal across all villages in the sample, and full risk sharing is assumed
within each village by restricting  ) (t f  to be equal across the households in each village.
In each district, the J test in the first row does not reject the null hypothesis of full risk
sharing at the five percent level.  For the baseline case, the point estimate of g is positive
and statistically significant in all districts except for Dir.  For Dir, the point estimate is
negative, but it is not significantly different from zero.  Because the standard error for g is
larger for Dir than is for the other three districts, the data for Dir do not seem to contain
much information about g. In the second, third, fourth, and fifth rows, the likelihood
ratio type test  statistic, C, is reported, which is the difference between the J value for
each row and that for the first row.  In the second row, we impose the restrictions that
) (t f  is the same across villages for each t =1,2.  If full risk sharing is achieved across
villages, then these restrictions must be satisfied.  We find overwhelming evidence
against these restrictions for each district from the C statistic reported in the second row.
Because full risk sharing is not likely to be achieved across villages given that private
information is more likely to be a problem there, this indicates that the J test's power
against incomplete risk sharing is at least not zero. The third row reports the variable
addition test results.  If the coefficient on the income change is significant for a village,
we reject the full risk sharing hypothesis for that village.  The C test tests the joint19
hypothesis that all the coefficients on the income changes are equal to zero.  We do not
reject the full risk sharing hypothesis for most villages except for Village 1 in Table II
and Village 22 in Table IV.  The C test does not reject the null hypothesis of full risk
sharing within villages. The fourth row reports the results when g is allowed to be
different across villages.  The C test does not reject the restriction that the subsistence
level is the same across villages.  The fifth and sixth rows report the results when g is
restricted to be zero.  This corresponds to Townsend's (1994) model, except that he uses
an exponential utility function.  The C test strongly rejects this restriction in the fifth row
for all districts except for Dir.  The C test statistic reported in the sixth row is the
difference between the J value in this row and that in the fifth row.  The J test in the fifth
row, and the C test in the sixth row test the null hypothesis of full risk sharing with g = 0.
These tests reject the null hypothesis of full risk sharing in all districts except for Dir.
These results indicate that one can find evidence against full risk sharing when
subsistence consumption is ignored.  Table V reports the results when the data for all four
districts are pooled.  The first row reports the baseline results in which subsistence
consumption (g) is restricted to be equal across all the villages in the whole sample, and
full risk sharing is assumed within each village.  In the second row, we find
overwhelming evidence against the null hypothesis of full risk sharing across districts.
The C statistic in the fourth row tests the hypothesis that g is the same across all the
households in the whole sample.  This hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent level, though
not at the 1 percent level.  The p values reported here, however, are based on the
asymptotic approximation.  It is possible that the approximation error is larger when the
data for Dir are included, given the large standard error for g found for Dir.  Indeed, when20
the data for Dir are excluded from the sample, we do not reject the hypothesis that g is the
same across all the households at the 10 percent level.
5.2 Results for the Indian Data Table VII presents the
results for the ICRISTA data.  The first row reports the baseline results.  The J test in the
first row does not reject the null hypothesis of full risk sharing at any conventional
significance level.  The point estimate of g is positive and statistically significant. In the
second row, we impose the restrictions that  ) (t f  is the same across villages for each t.
As in the Pakistani data, we find overwhelming evidence against these restrictions for
each district from the C statistic reported in the second row.  This result is expected
because full risk sharing is not likely to be achieved across villages given that they are far
apart.  The third row reports the variable addition test results.  No coefficient on the
income change is significant at the 5 percent level, and the C test does not reject the null
hypothesis of full risk sharing within villages.  The fourth row reports the results when g
is allowed to be different across villages.  The C test does not reject the restriction that the
subsistence level is the same across villages.
The fifth and sixth rows report the results when g is restricted to be zero.  As before,
this corresponds to Townsend's (1994) model.  The C test strongly rejects this restriction
in the fifth row.  The J test in the fifth row, and the C test in the sixth row test the null
hypothesis of full risk sharing with g = 0.  The J test in the fifth row rejects the null
hypothesis of full risk sharing within each village.  The C test in the sixth row does not
reject the null hypothesis at the fifteen percent level, but the income coefficient for
Shirapur rejects it for the village at the one percent level.  As in the Pakistani data, these21
results indicate that one can find evidence against full risk sharing when subsistence
consumption is ignored.
      6. CONCLUSIONS    In this paper, we have tested full
risk sharing hypothesis while taking into account the effect of estimating a parameter
which allows the RRA coefficient to vary with the level of wealth.  For 29 out of 31
villages in the Pakistani data and every village in the Indian data, we do not reject the
hypothesis of full risk sharing within each village.  Townsend (1995) finds that different
villages in low-income countries have strikingly different institutional arrangements to
cope with risk.  Hence, it is not surprising that we find evidence against full risk sharing
for two villages while we do not find such evidence for others. We, however, find
strong evidence against risk sharing across villages in both data sets.  Because it is more
difficult to cope with the private information problem across villages, this result is also
sensible.   When we restrict subsistence consumption parameter to be zero (which implies
CRRA), our tests replicate the well-known results of rejecting the full risk sharing
hypothesis even within villages in both datasets, except for one district, Dir, in the
Pakistani data.  However, except for this district, our tests always reject the restriction of
g = 0 in both datasets.  Thus, our test results show that misleading results may be obtained
when decreasing RRA is ignored in testing full risk sharing hypothesis.  In the empirical
risk sharing literature, isoelastic, quadratic and exponential utility functions are often
used. Because these utility functions imply either CRRA or increasing RRA, the test
results based on these preference specifications need to be interpreted with caution.22
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                                                                                    Whole Sample
Year                Faisalabad  Attock     Badin      Dir        Average
1986-87                 2849        3545        2184        2841        2820
1987-88                 2900        3108        1973        3519        2822
1988-89                 2142        2293        2017        2806        2296
1986-89                 2630        2982        2058        3055        264628
Village Average
                               N         1986-87   1987-88   1988-89   1986-89
Faisalabad
Vil. 1                      25          3572         2908        2212        2897
Vil. 2                      26          2212         2113        1857        2061
Vil. 3                      25          2866         3572        2155        2864
Vil. 4                      20          2779         3151        2362        2764
Vil. 5                      25          2661         2908        2116        2562
Vil. 6                      26          3010         2833        2200        2681
Attock
Vil. 7                      18          3591         4113        2409        3371
Vil. 8                      21          3628         3193        2210        3010
Vil. 9                      16          3990         2990        2327        3102
Vil. 10                    20          3632         3476        2470        3193
Vil. 11                    23          3102         3000        2157        2753
Vil. 12                    19          3615         2389        2024        2676
Vil. 13                    20          3131         2824        2242        2732
Vil. 14                    16          3898         2889        2596        3128
Badin
Vil. 21                    17          2131         2390        2285        2269
Vil. 22                    19          2414         2018        1950        2127
Vil. 23                    18          1793         1720        1875        1796
Vil. 24                    14          1807         1743        1801        1786
Vil. 25                    15          2159         2073        1914        2049
Vil. 26                    13          2755         2322        2064        2380
Vil. 29                    23          2439         2070        2154        2221
Vil. 30                    21          2103         1699        1966        1922
Vil. 34                    12          2359         1891        2119        2123
Vil. 37                    22          1896         1829        1941        1888
Vil. 39                    12          2340         2095        2155        2197
Dir
Vil. 41                    40          2878         3447        3152        3159
Vil. 42                    12          2624         3359        2807        2930
Vil. 45                    27          2706         3231        2386        2774
Vil. 47                    32          2842         3804        2836        3161
Vil. 48                    13          3145         3853        3043        3347
Vil. 51                    23          2872         3481        2518        2957
2. ICRISAT-India
         N  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1976-84
Aurepalle   35   313    381    408    538    502    423    414    409    526     423
Shirapur     33   604    555    644    543    623    521    388    351    351     528
Kanzara      36   490    489    418    578    571    479    418    578    571     363
__________________________________________________________________29
Notes:  1.  The figures here are in 1986 Pakistani Rupee (when 1 Rupee   
=US$.063), and 1975 Indian Rupee, respectively.
            2.  N indicates the number of households in the sample
                 in each village.30
   Table II     GMM Results for Food Consumption- Faisalabad
                                                                                            (IFPRI-Pakistan)




Dy t 1 1 ( ) +  
**
coeff.
Dy t 2 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 3 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 4 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 5 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 6 1 ( ) +
   J ***    C ***
Within 1511
*     …     …     …     …     …     …   25.7   …
    Vil. (124)  (.316,23)
Across 1447     …     …     …     …     …     …  115.2 89.55
    Vil.  (80)  (.000,33)   (.000,10)
Within 1474  .1659  .0012  .0361  -.0168  .0013 -.0046 19.7 5.95
    Vil. (146) (.0797) (.0190) (.0316) (.0504) (.0153) (.0108)  (.289,17)   (.429,6)
Within  …***     …     …     …     …     …     … 19.7 7.73
    Vil.  (.459,18) (.172,5)
Within  0     …     …     …     …     …     …   71.3  45.6
    Vil.  (.000,24)   (.000,1)
Within    0  .2808  .0273  .0134  -.0626 -.0053  .0002   49.2  22.1
    Vil. (.0699) (.0139) (.0308) (.0486) (.0106) (.0105)  (.000,18)   (.001,6)
               ________________________________________________________________________________________
              *: Standard errors are in parenthesis under the estimates, except for the two columns for the J and C
                 statistics, where the numbers in parenthesis are p-value and degree of freedom, respectively.
              **: The subscript of income difference term denotes village identification number, i.e., 1 for Vil. 1.
  ***: J is a c
2 statistic, and C is a likelihood ratio type statistic.
              ****: The subsistence estimates for Villages 1 to 6 are (with standard errors in parenthesis) as follows:
                      1851 (215), 1467 (240), 1131 (803), 1326 (335), 1738 (206), -512 (2411), respectively.
      Table III     GMM Results for Food Consumption- Attock
              (IFPRI-Pakistan)31




Dy t 7 1 ( ) +
 **
coeff.
Dy t 8 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 9 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 10 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 11 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 12 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 13 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 14 1 ( ) +
  J ***  C ***
Within 1867
*     …     …     …     …     …     …     …    …  37.8  …
    Vil. (117) (.187,31)
Across 1820     …   …     …     …     …     …     …    …  556.9 519.1
    Vil. (77) (.000,45) (.000,14)
Within 1749    .0214  .0013  .0785 -.0304 .0221 .0257  -.0618 .0079 28.1 9.7
    Vil. (148) (.0423) (.0284) (.0472) (.0163)  (.0606)  (.0211)  (.0501)  (.0203) (.212,23) (.290,8)
Within   …***     …   …     …     …     …     …     …    … 24.4 13.4
    Vil. (.441,24) (.063,7)
Within  0     …   …     …     …     …     …     …    …  122.0 82.2
    Vil. (.000,32) (.000,1)
Within    0  .0525  .0437  .0151 -.0573   .0199   .0509 -.0736 .0387 57.8 64.2
    Vil.  (.0397)  (.0184)  (.0161) (.0135)  (.0640)  (.0171) (.0557)  (.0140) (.000,24) (.000,8)
       __________________________________________________________________________________________________
          *: Standard errors are in parenthesis under the estimates, except for the two columns for the J and C
             statistics, where the numbers in parenthesis are p-value and degree of freedom, respectively.
          **: The subscript of income difference term denotes village identification number, i.e., 7 for Vil. 7.
          ***: J is a c
2 statistic, and C is a likelihood ratio type statistic.
          ****: The subsistence level estimates for Villages 7 to 14 are (with standard errors in parenthesis): 1998 (294),
                 1978 (172), -1445 (2175), 1936 (347), 1532 (607), 2018 (259), 1.9e+5 (1.9e+7), 2256 (265), respectively.
           Table IV    GMM Results for Food Consumption- Badin
















































1 y t ( ) +
   J ***   C ***32
Within 1441
*     …    …    …     …   …   …   …   …   …   …   …    44.2  …
    Vil. (84)  (.420,43)
Across 1701     …    …    …   …   …   …   …   …   …   …   …    326.0   282.2
    Vil. (48)  (.000,63) (.000,20)
Within 1434  .046  .110 -.047  .002  .019  .015  .005 .025 .044    .046 .029  28.8 15.4
    Vil. (100) (.038) (.050) (.046) (.067) (.012) (.022) (.013)  (.036)  (.034)  (.036)  (.032)  (.630,32) (.165,11)
Within  …***     …    …    …   …   …   …   …   …    …   …   …  29.4   14.8
    Vil.  (.647,33) (.140,10)
Within  0   …    …    …   …   …   …   …   …   …   …   …    92.9   48.7
    Vil.  (.000,44) (.000,1)
Within    0  .040  .124 -.079  .041  .027  .051   -.010   .047   .033   .040 -.005  50.4   42.5
    Vil.  (.038)  (.052)  (.042)  (.066)  (.013)  (.011)   (.012)  (.036)  (.028)  (.035)   (.020)  (.000,33) (.000,11)
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
     *: Standard errors are in parenthesis under the estimates, except for the two columns for the J and C
          statistics, where the numbers in parenthesis are p-value and degree of freedom, respectively.
     **: The subscript of income difference term denotes village identification number, i.e., 21 for Vil. 21, an so on.
     ***: J is a c
2 statistic, and C is a likelihood ratio type statistic.
     ****: The subsistence level estimates for Villages 21 to 39 are (with standard errors in parenthesis): 1627 (385),
          2018 (74), 1625 (147), 1760 (86), 1850 (18), 1254 (138), 1453 (334), 1405 (174),  2082 (221), 7172 (2e+5), 1768 (355),
          respectively.
                                                       Table V   GMM Results for Food Consumption- Dir
                                                                                            (IFPRI-Pakistan)




Dy t 41 1 ( ) +
 **
coeff.
Dy t 42 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 45 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 47 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 48 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 51 1 ( ) +
   J ***    C ***
Within -207
*     …     …     …     …     …     …   19.8   …
    Vil. (905)  (.652,23)
Across  976     …     …     …     …     …     …   58.3 38.48
    Vil.  (387)  (.004,33)   (.000,10)33
Within -317  .0387  .0019 -.0003  .0024 -.0055  .0235 15.2 4.62
    Vil. (1555) (.0340) (.0324) (.0110) (.0064) (.0202) (.0261)  (.570,17)   (.593,6)
Within  …***     …     …     …     …     …     …
    Vil.
Within  0     …     …     …     …     …     …   19.9  .06
    Vil.  (.703,24)   (.806,1)
Within    0  .0380  .0035  .0008  .0022 -.0088  .0018   17.2  2.7
    Vil. (.0339) (.0318) (.0098) (.0063) (.0139) (.0186)  (.511,18)   (.845,6)
   ________________________________________________________________________________________
              *: Standard errors are in parenthesis under the estimates, except for the two columns for the J and C
                  statistics, where the numbers in parenthesis are p-value and degree of freedom, respectively.
              **: The subscript of income difference term denotes village identification number, i.e., 41 for Vil. 41.
              ***: J is a c
2 statistic, and C is a likelihood ratio type statistic.
              ****: No convergence achieved for this case.
                            Table VI    GMM Results for Food Consumption- The Whole Sample
(IFPRI-Pakistan)




A g B g
D g coeff.
Dy t F( ) +1
 *
coeff.
Dy t A( ) +1
 coeff.
Dy t B( ) +1
coeff.
Dy t D( ) +1
  J ***   C ***
Within 1812 1812 1812 1812     …     …     …     … 146.2   …
    Vil. (27)** (.076,123)
Across 1767 1767 1767 1767     …     …     …     … 1093.2 947.1
   Dist. (29) (.000,177) (.000,54)
Within 1787 1787 1787 1787  .0010  .0007  .0135  .0054 138.0   8.2
    Vil. (27)  (.0077)  (.0087)   (.0048)   (.0060) (.112,119)   (.086,4)
Within 1639 1824 1851 1103     …     …     …     … 137.7 8.534
    Vil. (105) (119) (28) (468) (.129,120) (.037,3)
Within   0 0 0 0     …     …     …     … 406.7 260.6
    Vil. (.000,124)   (.000,1)
Within   0 0 0 0   .0092   .0155  .0160  .0047 388.0 18.7
    Vil. (.0059) (.0070) (.0049) (.0058) (.000,120)   (.001,4)
              _______________________________________________________________________________________
                    *: Subscripts F, A, B, and D are for Faisalabad, Attock, Badin, and Dir, respectively.
                    **: Standard errors are in parenthesis under the estimates, except for the two columns for the J and C
                          statistics, where the numbers in parenthesis are p-value and degree of freedom, respectively.
                    ***: J is a c
2 statistic, and C is a likelihood ratio type statistic.35
Table VII  GMM Results for Food Consumption
                                            (ICRISAT-India)
________________________________________________________________________
Risk                                                coeff.         coeff.        coeff.          J**              C
 **
Sharing       g A
*      g S        g K    Dy t A( ) +1
* Dy t S( ) +1  Dy t K( ) +1
Within        237.3**    237.3     237.3       …              …                 …          46.2               …
    Vil.          (15.2)                                                                                    (.507, 47)
Across         269.7      269.7     269.7        …              …                 …        1239.4          1193.2
    Vil.          (14.0)                                                                                    (.000, 63)     (.000, 16)
Within         238.4      238.4     238.4      .024           .011             .005         41.3              4.88
    Vil.          (16.1)                                 (.013)         (.011)          (.016)     (.589, 44)     (.181, 3)
Within         237.9      233.1     240.5        …             …                …           46.1               .03
    Vil.          (21.4)     (30.3)    (30.6)                                                         (.425, 45)     (.985, 2)
Within            0            0            0            …             …                …          114.5             68.3
    Vil.                                                                                                        (.000, 48)     (.000, 1)
Within
    Vil.              0            0            0          .012          .033             .012          102.3            12.2
                                                               (.011)        (.010)          (.016)      (.000, 45)     (.007, 3)
________________________________________________________________________
 *: Subscripts A, S, and K denote Aurepalle, Shirapur, and Kanzara, respectively.
 **: Standard errors are in parenthesis under the estimates, except for the two
      columns for the J and C statistics, where the numbers in parenthesis are p-
      value and degree of freedom, respectively.
 ***: J is a c
2 statistic, and C is a likelihood ratio type statistic.